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Selig and Schmittberger: Tax Aspects of Commodity Futures Trading

TAX ASPECTS OF
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
Stephen F. Selig* and R. Wayne Schmittberger**
In May 1977, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a rul(the Ruling) which retroactively overturned previously established principles involving tax treatment of commodity futures
straddles. 2 This Ruling, which has touched off a wave of controversy among tax lawyers, accountants, investment advisors, and
investors, already has had a noticeable impact on futures trading
and will inevitably be challenged. 3 This article will examine the
Ruling within the context of established principles of taxation of
4
commodity futures transactions.
ing1

* Member, New York Bar. A.B., 1954, Williams College; LL.B., 1957, Columbia
University. Mr. Selig is currently a member of the Special Committee on Commodities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the
American Bar Association Committee on Commodities Regulation. In addition, he
was a member of the CFTC Advisory Committee on the Definition and Regulation
of Market Instruments and its Subcommittee on Commodity Options.
** Member, New York Bar. B.A., 1971, Yale University; J.D., 1975, New York
University.
1. Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7. For additional commentary on this Ruling,
see Goldfein & Hochberg, An Analysis of IRS' Ruling that Straddle Transactions
Lack Requisite Profit Motive, 47 J. TAX. 142 (1977).
2. A straddle is a simultaneously held long and short position in different
maturities of the same commodity. See text accompanying notes 39-43 infra.
3. See Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to Jerome
Kurtz, IRS Commissioner (Jurre -24, 197), reprinted in DAILY EXECUTIVE REPORT (BNA), No. 125, G-9 (1977). The letter requested that the Ruling be withdrawn
because: (1) the Ruling deals with the subjective intent of the taxpayer, would be
difficult to administer, and could have pervasive effects; (2) the Ruling could have
significant adverse impact on world commodity markets, currency exchange differentials, and possibly consumer prices and inflation; (3) despite wide publicity concerning the use of straddles, the IRS has consistently and routinely accepted such straddles as legitimate transactions on audit; (4) the Code, regulations, and case law do
not support the technical conclusions reached in the Ruling; (5) the Ruling raises
certain ambiguities which will create difficulties for tax practitioners and uncertainties of application (e.g., what would have happened if the taxpayer had made a profit
from the "straddles"?). As an alternative to withdrawal of the Ruling, the letter requested that it be applied only prospectively, so that taxpayers relying on longstanding IRS positions not be penalized. See also Letter from Arthur Anderson & Co. to
Jerome Kurtz, IRS Commissioner (July 21, 1977), reprinted in DAILY EXECUTIVE
REPORT (BNA), No. 151, J-8 (1977).

4. This article presupposes that the reader has a degree of familiarity with
commodity futures trading. For those without commodities background, see J.BAER
& 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 126-250 (1949); S.
KROLL & I. SmssKo, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE 9-26 (1973).
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COMMODITY FuTuIuES AS CAPITAL ASSETS

Persons who trade commodity futures fall into two broad
categories: (1) members of the public (commonly called investors
or speculators) and floor traders on various exchanges (commonly
called locals or scalpers), who seek to profit from the rise or decline in the price of a given commodity; and (2) businessmen (commonly referred to as hedgers) who produce, refine, use, finance,
or deal in a given commodity and who seek to protect themselves
from the effect of adverse price fluctuations in that commodity. 5
Commodity futures contracts are capital assets in the hands of
an investor; 6 gain or loss resulting from transactions involving
commodities is capital gain or loss which may be either long-term
or short-term according to the holding period. 7 However, gain or
loss realized by hedgers from futures contracts is regarded as a factor in the cost of inventory and is thus characterized as ordinary gain
or loss." This rule is reflected in the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code) section 1233(g), 9 which removes hedging transactions from
that provision's short sale rules. A taxpayer seeking to have a transaction classified as a hedge' ° must prove'1 that the transaction falls
within IRS guidelines. 12 These guidelines require: (1) a risk of loss
by unfavorable changes in the price of a commodity expected to be
used or marketed in one's business; (2) a possibility of shifting such
risk to someone else through the purchase or sale of futures contracts; and (3) an intention and attempt to shift the risk.13
Commodity futures contracts entered into by a commodities
professional' 4 are capital assets.' 5 This contrasts with securities,
5. Hedging is defined by 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1977). For a general discussion of
persons who trade commodity futures, see J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 4, at
51-54 (hedgers and speculators); id. at 75 (floor traders or "scalpers").
6. Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 822 (1942).
7. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
8. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd,
350 U.S. 46 (1955). Since Corn Products is important in analyzing the legal merits of
the Ruling, this article discusses the case in some detail. See text accompanying
notes 97-108 infra.
9. I.R.C. § 1233(g).
10. Such a taxpayer usually is seeking an ordinary loss.
11. Kenneth S. Battelle, 47 B.T.A. 117 (1942).
12. These guidelines may be found at 6 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
4717.107 (1976).
13. These guidelines were approved by the Supreme Court. See Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
14. Commodities professionals include brokers, dealers, and futures commission merchants.
15. Henry I. Seroussi, 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1349, 1353 (1963).
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which are deemed inventory in the hands of a dealer unless speci16
fically designated as held for investment.
Calculation of the length of a holding period to determine
whether a capital gain or loss is long-term or short-term requires
consideration of several special rules for commodities. First, futures contracts held for more than six months qualify for long-term
capital gain or loss treatment; unlike the holding period for other
capital assets, the holding period for commodity futures was not
changed by section 1402(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to a
longer period. 17 Although the statute on its face applies to all futures contracts, 18 the Conference Committee Report (the Report)
on Public Law 94-455 describes this special rule as limited to "agricultural" commodity futures contracts. 19 The Report does not justify the "agricultural" limitation, but this distinction may have been
drawn because of the seasonal nature of agricultural commodities.
Why this characteristic should affect the length of the holding
period for capital gain or loss determination has not been explained; however, the only practical effect of that modification is to
give certain futures markets a competitive advantage over others
with respect to attracting the business of members of the trading
20
public.
To determine a capital gain or loss holding period, a taxpayer
may add the time that he held a futures contract to the holding
period of any commodity acquired by taking delivery in fulfillment of that contract. 2 1 In some cases, because of the longer holding period for physical commodities, a commodity's sale after delivery may result in short-term treatment for gains or losses which

16. I.R.C. § 1236.
17. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 140 2 (a), 90 Stat. 1520 (amending I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4)).
Section 1402(d) amended I.R.C. § 1222 by excluding commodity futures transactions

from amendments made by § 1402(a) to the holding period.
18. On March 30, 1977, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced a
clarification of the amendment, stating that it is not limited to futures transactions in
agricultural commodities. IRS News Release IR-1787.
19.

COMM. OF CONFERENCE, HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No.

1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 508, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4118, 4210. See also HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3238; STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 427 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 1, 439.

20. See generally The Special Committee on Commodities Regulation, Capital
Gains Holding Period for Commodity Futures, 32 REc. A.B. CITY NEW YORK 235
(1977).
21. I.R.C. § 1223(8).
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would have been long-term had the futures contract itself been
liquidated.
Special rules for short sales set forth in Code section 1233 and
regulations thereunder are major aspects of the tax treatment of
commodity futures transactions. These rules may be summarized
22
as follows:
1. On the date of a short sale of a futures contract, if substantially identical property has been held for nine months 23 or
less, or if substantially identical property is acquired by the
taxpayer after such short sale on or before the closing date
thereof, then
(a) gain on the closing of the short sale will be a short-term
capital gain regardless of the holding period of the property used to close the short sale; and
(b) provisions to the contrary notwithstanding, the holding
period of the substantially identical property acquired during the defined period, when other such property is used
to close the transaction, begins on the date of the closing
of the short position.
2. A loss incurred by closing a short sale vill be a long-term
capital loss if, on the date of the short sale, substantially identical property has been held by the taxpayer for more than
nine months.2 4
The main problem in interpreting and applying these rules is ascertaining the meaning of "substantially identical" property. For
example, is a commodity held by a taxpayer "substantially similar" to a futures contract involving that commodity? Code section
1233(e)(2)(B) provides:
[I]n the case of futures transactions in any commodity on or subject to the rules of a board of trade or commodity exchange, a
commodity future requiring delivery in 1 calendar month shall
not be considered as property substantially identical to another
commodity future requiring delivery in a different calendar
month ....

25

22. I.R.C. § 1233; Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1, T.D. 6207, 1956-2 C.B. 529, as
amended by T.D. 6494, 1960-2 C.B. 219, T.D. 6926, 1967-2 C.B. 289.
23. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the holding periods under I.R.C.
§ 1233 to nine months for transactions entered into in 1977 and one year for transactions entered into thereafter. I.R.C. § 1402(b)(1)(T). Previously, the holding period
had been six months.
24. See note 23 supra.
25. I.R.C. § 1233(e)(2)(B).
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This section does not specifically preclude the consideration of a
futures contract as substantially identical to a corresponding
amount of the particular physical commodity owned by the trader
and available for closing of the sale. The prevailing view 2 6 is that a
futures contract is substantially identical only to another contract
for the same commodity requiring delivery in the same month.
This opinion avoids potential conflict between Code section 1223(8)
and Code section 1233.27
CASH-AND-CARRY TRANSACTIONS

As noted above, a commodity owned by a trader is neither
property subject to Code section 1233(b) or (d)28 nor property
"substantially identical" to a futures contract for the same commodity.2 9 If the commodity was held for the statutory period, 30
gain from using the commodity to close a short sale will be longterm. It is possible, therefore, subject to IRS challenge, 3 1 to convert ordinary income in one year into capital gain in a later year
through the so-called "cash-and-carry" transaction. For example,
assume that in July 1977, a trader purchases 5000 ounces of physical silver for $4.62 per ounce ($23,100 total purchase price) and
simultaneously sells short one July 1978 silver futures contract for
$4.93 per ounce ($24,650 total sales price). The trader has a
locked-in profit of $1550, which he will realize as long-term capital
gain when he closes the short sale by delivering the physical silver
in March 1979.
If the trader finances most of the purchase price of the physical silver, he is entitled to tax deductions for interest payments
under Code section 163,32 and for storage fees and insurance under
Code section 212. 3 3 In the above example, if 80% of the purchase
price was financed at a 7% interest rate, 34 the interest payable over
26. See Selig, Tax Aspects of Trading in Commodity Futures Contracts, in
COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 61 (Practising Law Institute 1975).
27. I.R.C. §§ 1223(8), 1233. A different view would render I.R.C. § 1223(8) sur-

plusage.
28. I.R.C. § 1233(b), (d). See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
30. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
32. I.R.C. § 163.
33. I.R.C. § 212.
34. Because the transaction is hedged, that is, sold short at fixed price, financial
terms for such transactions are generally favorable. Also, while a lender may require
additional payments if the price of the commodity declines, the variation margin
received on the short futures position should substantially offset the required payments.
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the twelve months that the silver is owned would be $1293. Storage fees 3 5 and insurance costs3 6 would provide additional, although
relatively small, deductions.
The IRS could challenge these tax consequences of cash-andcarry transactions by either of two approaches. First, it could argue
that a physical commodity is property "substantially identical" to a
futures contract and is therefore subject to the unfavorable short
sale rules of section 1233. Second, the IRS could contend that
Goldstein v. Commissioner,37 which disallowed deductions for
losses incurred in transactions having tax avoidance as their sole
purpose, should be applied; the only motivation for these transactions is tax avoidance. However, the courts have not yet adopted
either interpretation. In fact, the potential for profit that exists in
cash-and-carry transactions 38 makes Goldstein's application to such
transactions highly unlikely.
COMMODITY STRADDLES

Background
In its simplest form, a straddle consists of simultaneously held
long and short positions of commodity futures in different maturities. 39 The price discrepancy between the contracts in different
months is known as the "spread" or "differential." For nonperishable commodities, the spread typically reflects carrying charges such
as interest, insurance, and storage fees. For perishable commodities, it also reflects seasonal price differences and relative differences in supply and demand between old and new crop maturities.
Straddle transactions offer opportunity for profit and risk of
loss because of the widening or narrowing of the spreads between
the straddle months. While an investor who takes a long or short
35.
36.
37.

I.R.C. § 162. See McIntosh Mills, 9 B.T.A. 301 (1927).
I.R.C. § 162.
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). For a de-

tailed discussion of Goldstein v. Commissioner, id., see text accompanying notes
126-131 infra.
38. Cash-and-carry transactions typically are entered into when the price differential between a nearby and a distant futures maturity exceeds the actual cost of
carrying the physical commodity to the distant month.
39. E.g., long 10 October 1977 sugar contracts and short 10 July 1978 sugar
contracts. Straddles can also involve intermarket transactions, such as long New York
silver and short Chicago silver, and intercrop transactions, such as long corn and
short wheat.
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futures position seeks to profit by absolute price fluctuations, an
investor who effects a straddle seeks to profit by changes in price
differences. A straddle investor may not care whether the price of
a given commodity increases or decreases. His concern is the direction in which price differences change.
There are various types of straddles.4 0 For example, assume
that silver futures are traded in what is called a full-carry market
(distant maturity price equals current month price plus interest,
storage, and insurance costs). A person expecting interest rates to
decline would go long in a nearby maturity and simultaneously sell
short in a distant one. If interest rates decline, the price of distant
silver relative to nearby silver should decline, resulting in a profit.
However, if the price of silver should rise materially, the potential
profit could be reduced: Although interest rates have declined, the
number of dollars needed to finance higher-priced silver has increased, thereby increasing the carrying charges.
Another type of straddle involves potential short term supply
imbalances. For example, because of a threatened strike of United
States copper miners, the price of nearby copper may be high relative to distant copper. An investor who believes either that there
will be no strike or that the labor strife will be short-lived would
go short nearby copper and long a distant maturity. If that person's
forecast is correct, the price of nearby copper will decline relative
to that of the distant month.
Traders also enter into straddles because of potential changes
in currency values. A person anticipating a decline in the value of
the pound sterling relative to the dollar would buy London sugar
and sell New York sugar. This investor has no interest in the
movement of sugar prices. However, if the relative value of the
pound declines, the price of London sugar should rise relative to
the price of New York sugar.
The attractiveness of straddles for commodity futures traders
has been enhanced by certain tax benefits flowing from the above
principles. 4 ' An investor who realizes short-term capital gains from
unrelated transactions could, by using straddles, defer them to
another year and, hopefully, convert them into long-term capital
gains. This serendipitous result occurs because Code section
1233(e)(2)(B) provides that "a commodity future requiring delivery
40. For an extensive discussion of this subject, see S. KROLL & I. SMISHKO, supra
note 4, at 237-57.
41. See text accompanying notes 6-7, 22-24 supra. See also short sale rules of
I.R.C. § 1233.
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in 1 calendar month shall not be considered as property substantially identical to another commodity future requiring delivery in a
different calendar month ....-42
Thus, if in the first example above, silver declined in price,
the nearby maturity could be closed out at a loss and replaced with
a long position in another month. If the price increased, the distant
position could be liquidated and replaced. The same could be done
with the copper and sugar straddles described in the other two
examples.
If the long side of the straddle were profitable and could be
maintained for more than six months, short-term gain of the first
year could be converted into long-term gain of the second year. As
noted previously, the closeout of a short position by offset will always result in a short-term gain or loss, no matter how long the
43
position has been maintained.
The Ruling
On May 23, 1977, the IRS ruled 44 that a taxpayer could not
deduct the loss which resulted from simultaneously closing one
side of a silver straddle and opening a new offsetting position in a
different delivery month. This position was taken despite the significant economic loss resulting from the transactions which indicated that substantial profit might have been realized. 4 5 Although
the Ruling discussed only silver straddles, it was intended to apply
to straddles in all commodity futures and is retroactive to 1974.46
The facts described in the Ruling are typical of a straddle in its
simplest form. They do not differ materially from those set forth in
the original ruling request, although the numbers and dates have
been changed, apparently to disguise the taxpayer's identity. The
Ruling states that "[i]n order to minimize the tax consequences of a
short-term capital gain of 150x dollars realized from the sale of real
property in 1 9 75,"47 a taxpayer entered into the transactions in
silver futures contracts shown in the following table:
42.

I.R.C. § 1233(e)(2)(B).

43.

See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.

44.
45.

See Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7.
The market could just as easily have moved in a direction favorable to the

straddler. Because of commission costs, however, potential net profit is not as great
as potential net loss, if other factors are equal. This is true of all transactions which
require a broker's services and should not be material.
46. Wall St. J., May 27, 1977, at 8, col. 4.
47. Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7, at 7.
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Silver Futures Contracts Transactions4
Date of
Maturity Dates of Contracts
Purchase
(Sale)
March '76 May '76 July '76
8/1/75
8/1/75

40

8/4/75

(40)

(40)

8/4/75
2/18/76

40

2/18/76

(40)

40

Gain (Loss)
Before
Price Commissions
2,000x
1,951x

1,825x

(126x)

1,851x
2,051x
2,025x

(51x)
174x

Because the taxpayer incurred a commission charge of 2x dollars
on the closing of each transaction, the overall 1975 loss was 128x
dollars, and the overall 1976 gain was 119x dollars (17 2x less
5 3x). 49 Purchases
and sales indicated as made on the same day
were actually made simultaneously, so that the taxpayer consistently maintained a straddle position. The IRS noted that the books
of the taxpayer's brokerage firm showed the August 4 transaction as
a debit to the taxpayer's account until it was canceled out by the
February 18, 1976 sale of the May 1976 futures contracts. 50 The
IRS further observed that because of the limited risk inherent in
such spread positions, the margin requirement to finance the
purchases and short sales amounted to .0025 of the aggregate
number of futures contracts purchased, or about 10x dollars. 5 1 The
Ruling also stated that the taxpayer's change in position from a
March/July straddle to a May/July straddle resulted in no change in
economic position. 52
As support for the Ruling, the IRS relied upon regulation 1.1651(b) which provides:
To be allowable as a deduction under section 165(a), a loss must
be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by
identifiable events, and, [with exceptions not here relevant] actually sustained during the taxable year. Only a bona fide loss is
allowable. Substance and not mere form shall govern in determining a deductible loss. 53
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 93, as amended by T.D.
6735, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 100.
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The IRS also based its position on two Tax Court opinions. In
Frederick R. Horne,54 a taxpayer who owned a seat on the New
York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., bought a new seat, and a
few days thereafter, sold his original seat. 5 5 The sale of the original
seat, if viewed as an independent transaction, resulted in a deductible loss. The Tax Court ruled, however, that the loss could not
be deducted, because the sale of the seat, when considered in conjunction with the taxpayer's purchase of a new seat, was part of an
5
overall plan resulting in no change in taxpayer's position. 6
In Gordon MacRae,5 7 also relied upon by the IRS, taxpayer
sought to deduct interest on money borrowed to purchase United
States Treasury notes. The court disallowed the deduction because
the transaction was an economic sham. 58
The IRS therefore concluded:
Under the rationale of section 1.165-1(b) of the regulations
and of the Horne and MacRae decisions, the taxpayer in the instant case suffered no real economic loss in 1975. On August 1,
1975, the taxpayer had established a balanced position in silver
futures contracts. After closing out the long position on August
4, 1975, the taxpayer continued a balanced position in silver contracts by immediately purchasing the 40 May 1976 contracts.
After the sale and purchase of the silver futures contracts on
August 4, the taxpayer was in exactly the same balanced position
as before these transactions, with the only difference being the
month of delivery of the replacement contracts. Thus, the August 4 sale resulted in no real change of position in a true
economic sense, and does not represent a closed and completed
transaction.59
The Ruling also stated that the taxpayer could not deduct his
out-of-pocket losses incurred in connection with the straddle
transactions. 6 0 In support of this position, the IRS cited Knetsch v.
United States6 1 and Brown v. United States6 2 for the proposition
54.

5 T.C. 250 (1945).

55. Id. at 251.
56. See id. at 255.
57.

34 T.C. 20'(1960).

58. See id. at 27.
59. Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7, at 8 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. CI. 1965). This action to recover out-of-pocket losses
arose from the same transaction litigated in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361
(1960), see text accompanying notes 122-125 infra.
62. 396 F.2d 459 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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that deductions may not be claimed for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in transactions that lack economic substance. The IRS determined that the transactions had no economic substance, stating:
In the instant case, the taxpayer's dominant purpose for engaging in the above described silver futures transactions was to
create an artificial short-term capital loss to offset a substantial
short-term capital gain realized on the sale of real property,
while insuring that no real economic effect resulted from such
transactions. The taxpayer had no reasonable expectation of de63
riving an economic profit from the transactions.

The structure of the Ruling is rather curious: The IRS asserted
what would have been its strongest argument if factually accurate
-that the taxpayer possibly had no reasonable expectation of profit
from the transactions-only to support its position on the nondeductibility of out-of-pocket expenses. 6 4 In contrast, the IRS based its
finding with regard to the case's central issue upon the weaker argument that the loss transactions were not closed and completed transactions. This argument conflicts with accepted principles of realization of gain and loss, as well as with case law and previous revenue
rulings. 6 5 The reasons for the Ruling's final structure may be un63. Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7, at 8 (emphasis added). This factual conclusion is questionable, since the Taxpayer's Statement of Position re Request for
Technical Advice (Apr. 29, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Statement] stated:
[Pirior to entering into the straddles . . . I, the attorney-in-fact, asked the
representative of [the brokerage firm] if there was potential for substantial
profit or loss relative to the investment and he said there was. If he had
answered otherwise, I would have advised that they do not enter into the
straddle. A copy of a letter addressed to me which confirms this is enclosed.
Id. at 1. Subsequently, the Statement noted: "Enclosed is copy of letter from . . .
who I understand is [the brokerage firm's] top expert on commodity straddles. This
letter shows that there was indeed substantial gain or loss potential. What is more,
the taxpayers were personally liable to make good any loss over and above their
margin." Id. at 2. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service National Office Technical Advice Memorandum (Sept. 20, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Memo of Sept. 20,
1975], which considered the request which gave rise to the Ruling, stated: "The
commodity futures transaction entered into by the taxpayers in 1973 offered a valid
opportunity for an economic profit, completely apart from the opportunity of obtaining a tax loss. Therefore, this transaction may not be disallowed by the Service as
lacking economic reality." Id. at 6. Upon reconsideration in a later memorandum, the
National Office still contended that the lack of profit potential in straddles was "too
conjectural" for purposes of proving pure tax avoidance motivation. Internal Revenue
Service National Office Memorandum re Reconsideration of Technical Advice
Memorandum of Sept. 26, at 2 (Sept. 26, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Memo of Sept.
26, 1975]. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
64. See text accompanying notes 121-131 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 76-115 infra.
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derstood by examining the development of the IRS position as evidenced by certain IRS interoffice memorandums.
According to a Request for Technical Advice Submitted to the
National Office, the initial position taken by the agent who received the ruling request was that the straddle losses should be
disallowed. 6 6 In support of this contention, the agent advanced the
following arguments:67
1. The transactions offered no realistic expectation of profit, and hence were initiated solely for tax avoidance.
2. Corn Products68 holds that taxpayers are not permitted
to transmute ordinary income into capital gain at will' "69 via
hedging transactions. In the case of straddles, hedging lockedin gains to delay realization creates just such a transmutation.
3. The low margin requirement for straddles evidences
the lack of economic substance to the transactions.
4. Taxpayer employed the cash basis method of accounting and incurred no out-of-pocket loss in the year of the
claimed deductions.
5. (Alternate Position) The entire series of transactions
should be treated as a single transaction, resulting in realization of only a single short-term capital loss in the final year.
The agent emphasized that to keep margin requirements low
and to minimize risk, the taxpayer only entered into paired simultaneous transactions. In addition, graphs of the silver futures prices
plotted against time demonstrated nearly constant spreads between
silver futures contracts expiring on different dates. 70 An article from
Barron's magazine underscored the proposition that " 'straddles are
not expected to generate any net gain or loss.' "71
The IRS National Office initially asserted that the transactions
could not be disallowed on any of the grounds suggested by the
66. See Request for Technical Advice Submitted to the National Office by the
District Office in Los Angeles, California 4 (1975).
67. See id.
68. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd,
350 U.S. 46 (1955).
69. Request for Technical Advice Submitted to the National Office by the District Office in Los Angeles, California 6 (1975) (quoting Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 53-54 (1955)).
70. See Request for Technical Advice Submitted to the National Office by the
District Office in Los Angeles, California 5 (1975).
71. Id. at 4 (quoting Briloff, Commodity Shelters Turn Short-Term Capital Gain
Long, Barron's, March 25, 1974).
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agent.7 2 Corn Products, it reasoned, dealt with hedgers and had no
application to speculators. 73 In addition, the National Office dismissed claims of lack of economic substance to the transactions,
stating, "it does appear that straddle transactions do offer a very
real opportunity for profits to a taxpayer, aside from any tax savings
74
involved."
Upon reconsideration, the National Office decided that the
deductions should be disallowed, but remained unwilling to base
the Ruling upon the ground that the transactions were without
economic substance. The National Office explained its position:
"Although the hypotheticals . . . presented do tend to illustrate
that silver straddles have the potential for creating a tax loss for an
individual, this information is too conjecturalfor purposes of proving that the taxpayer's motive for entering into the straddle transac75
tions was purely to generate a tax loss."
Although the National Office ultimately reached the same conclusion as was reached in the Ruling, it did not suggest the basis
for disallowing the deductions eventually relied upon in the Ruling:
the Code section 165(c) and regulation 1.165-1(b) requirements of
profit motive in a loss transaction and the existence of a bona fide
loss. The merits of the IRS' argument finally relied upon to justify
the Ruling will now be discussed in detail.
Analysis
A sale or exchange of property is an event which causes the
realization of gain or loss. Regulation 1.165-1(b) indicates that a
deduction for a loss resulting from such a sale or exchange is allowable only if it is a bona fide loss on a closed and completed transaction. 76 However, Frederick R. Horne77 and Gordon MacRae, 78 the
cases relied upon by the IRS in the Ruling, are readily distinguishable from the facts described in the Ruling.
Frederick R. Hone involved a taxpayer who owned one seat
on the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., bought a second
seat, and shortly thereafter sold his original seat. The critical distinction between the facts in Hone and those which are the sub72. See Memo of Sept. 20, 1975, supra note 63.

73. Id. at 5.
74. Id.
75. Memo of Sept. 26, 1975, supra note 63, at 2.
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b), T.D. 6445, 1960-1 C.B. 93, as amended by
T.D. 6735, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 100.
77. 5 T.C. 250 (1945). See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
78. 34 T.C. 20 (1960). See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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ject of the Ruling is that seats on an exchange are identical in all
respects, while futures contracts involving different delivery
months are not. This characterization of futures contracts has been
recognized judicially on several occasions. 79 Thus, reliance upon
Home would be appropriate only if the taxpayer, in an effort to
realize an accrued gain or loss, had closed out a futures position
and simultaneously reestablished the same position in the same delivery month. However, this would be a wash sale prohibited by
the Act.8 0
Reliance upon Gordon MacRae8 l is more inapposite. Although
this opinion contained language which, when taken out of context,
might initially appear to be in point, the case involved a sham
transaction in which the taxpayer, as conceded in the Ruling, "did
not purchase the notes, did not borrow large sums of money, and
did not pay any amount deductible as interest."8 2 By contrast, a
commodity futures contract confers genuine rights and imposes real
obligations upon the buyer or seller.
In addition to its scant support in the cases cited, the Ruling's
thesis-that the straddle losses did not arise from a closed and
completed transaction-conflicts with both other revenue rulings
and case law more nearly in point than Home or MacRae.
In Revenue Ruling 71-568,8 3 the IRS concluded that the wash
sales provisions of Code section 109184 do not apply to commodity
futures contracts, because such contracts are neither stocks nor
securities. This ruling resolved a conflict between the Sixth Circuit,
which had held wash sale rules to be applicable to commodity
86
futures, 8 5 and other circuits, which had held to the contrary.
In Revenue Ruling 74-223,87 the IRS stated that dealers who
hedge physical or forward commodity positions on the futures mar79. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9973 (M.D.
Ga.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 68 (1941); Robert M.
Harriss, 44 B.T.A. 999 (1941), aff'd, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944).
80. See I.R.C. § 1091. See generally COMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 12,725.15155 (1974).
81. 34 T.C. 20 (1960).
82. Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7, at 8.
83. 1971-2 C.B. 312.
84.

I.R.C. § 1091.

85. See Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945).
86. See, e.g., Sicanoff Vegetable Corp., 251 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1958); Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46
(1955).
87. 1974-1 C.B. 23.
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ket may offset gains or losses on those positions with hypothetical
gains or losses on the futures market; those hypothetical gains or
losses are based upon the market value of their open futures
positions. 88 More importantly, the IRS noted that speculators cannot engage in such offsets and must actually close their futures
positions before realizing any gain or loss therefrom. 8 9 Such a view
is inconsistent with the Ruling, which in effect requires that
speculators offset a closed futures position with an open one to
delay realization of loss. 90
The issues raised in Valley Waste Mills v. Page9 ' parallel those
addressed by the Ruling. In Valley Waste Mills a taxpayer closed
out its long cotton futures position and simultaneously established a
new long position in a more distant delivery month. Taxpayer argued that recognition of the gain which resulted from closing out
the initial long position should be deferred until liquidation of his
new long position. 9 2 Contrary to the Ruling, the IRS asserted that
closing out the initial position made the transaction complete for
tax purposes; that the taxpayer had simultaneously opened a new
93
long position was irrelevant.
Both the Tax Court 94 and the Fifth Circuit 95 concurred with
the IRS. The Fifth Circuit stated:
It is appellant's contention that taxable gains or deductible
losses from its transactions resulted only when it, in closing out a
cotton contract, did not simultaneously purchase another contract for the future delivery of a like amount of cotton; but we
cannot accept this view under the facts set forth in the agreed
statement. There is no dispute about the profit that was made on
these purchases, and the fact that other contracts for the purchase of an equal quantity of cotton of the same grade, staple,
and character were simultaneously made by it is not sufficient to
relieve the appellant of the tax upon the profit actually realized
upon the contract which was finally closed out during the taxable
year.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See generally Rev. Rul. 74-227, 1974-1 C.B. 120.
91. 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9973 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 68 (1941).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9975.
94. Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9973 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115
F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 68 (1941).
95. Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 115 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 68 (1941).
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Appellant argues that the effect of its operations was merely
to switch the delivery dates of its futures contracts .
. ;
[however,] it is admitted that switching of delivery dates is not
permissible under the rules of either of the exchanges on which
these sales and purchases were made. Each contract was treated
as separate and independent by the parties themselves, doubtless separate commissions were charged for each transaction, and
the appellant should not be permitted to combine, for incometax purposes, that which the parties have elected to make separate and independent for all other purposes. 96
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.97 In Corn Products petitioner,
a manufacturer of corn products, used large quantities of corn in its
business and could store only about a three weeks' supply at a
given time. 98 To insure a stable price for the corn and to offset the
impact of price fluctuations caused by temporary supply shortages,
petitioner purchased corn futures. 9 9 Petitioner did not attempt to
protect itself from price declines, although it did have some future
sales commitments, predominantly of unfixed character.100 Purchases and sales of such futures resulted in a gain of approximately
$680,000 in 1940 and a loss of approximately $110,000 in 1942.101
Petitioner argued that such gains and losses were capital under
Code section 117(a). 10 2 It contended that the judicial exception to
Code section 117(a) for hedging transactions was improper; alternatively, petitioner asserted that that section was inapplicable to it.
Its transactions were atypical hedges, because they were designed
to protect petitioner against price rises but not against price
declines. 10 3 In addition, petitioner argued that many of its past
purchases and sales of futures contracts were wash sales within the
meaning of Code section 118; consequently, the losses from such
transactions should have increased the basis of the futures sold in
1940 and 1942.104
The Second Circuit noted that the Tax Court had held that
petitioner's futures transactions gave rise to ordinary income and
96. Id. at 467-68.
97. 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
98. Id. at 514.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 515.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 516.
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loss, because its systematic purchases of corn futures were an integral part of its business. 10 5 The circuit court indicated that the
so-called "judge-made exception" to Code section 117(a) for hedging was misnamed; courts merely had recognized that the nature of
hedging transactions made them logically inseparable from such
business expenditures as inventory purchases. As a result, such
transactions fall within the statutory exclusions of Code section
117(a). 10 6 While perhaps not a "true" hedge, petitioner's futures
transactions were very similar to a hedge and were in fact a form of
partial price insurance.
On the wash sale question, both the Second Circuit and the
Tax Court held against petitioner, reasoning that (1) commodity futures contracts which are identical except for price and delivery
month are not "substantially identical" properties, and (2) commodity futures contracts are not securities. 10 7 With respect to the
former ground, the Tax Court stated:
A new future commodity contract is not "substantially identical"
with any prior contract even though the quantity involved in
each is identical. It would be purely accidental if the new contract was with the same party as the one who had agreed to sell
the commodity in the earlier contract. The price would probably
be different and the delivery date would certainly be different
... . Sales of such contracts are conpleted [sic] transactions
when made, the gain or loss is recognized at that time, and there
is no postponement of the gain or loss for tax purposes. 0 8

In addition, numerous courts have considered whether losses
sustained in transactions involving a sale or purchase of stocks and
securities are deductible. In Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance,109
losses from a sale of bonds, most of which were repurchased by the
seller on the same day, were held to be deductible. The wash sale
rules" 0 had not yet been enacted, and the court found no evidence that the transactions were not* bona fide. The concept of
bona fide transactions led to a different result in Esperson v.
105. See id.at 515.
106. See id. at 516.
107. Id.; Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 16 T.C. 395, 399 (1951), aff'd, 215 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
108. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 16 T.C. 395, 400 (1951), aff'd, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir.
1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (emphasis added). See also Robert M. Harriss, 44
B.T.A. 999 (1941), aff'd, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944).
109. 2 B.T.A. 48 (1925), acq. IV-2 C.B. 4 (1925).
110. I.R.C. § 1091.
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Commissioner.'1 1 In Esperson taxpayer sold stock to agents who
transferred the stock back to taxpayer. The court denied the loss
deduction, stating that "no real sale is made where by one and the
same transaction the same number of shares are both bought and
sold at the same time and at the same price."11 2 A loss deduction
was also denied in Commissioner v. Dyer, 1 3 where taxpayers sold
stock in a corporation to the wholly-owned subsidiary of that corporation, thereby incurring a loss. Thirty-four days later, taxpayers
returned the notes which had been used for payment, thereby repurchasing the stock. The court found that the repurchase had
been prearranged and held that no loss could be realized, because
the taxpayers had never really lost ownership of the stock. In Marston v. Commissioner,1 1 4 however, a trustee who sold stock to a
trust and later reacquired the stock was allowed to deduct a loss
incurred from the sale, because the absence of a prearranged plan
made the sale bona fide.
In Schoenberg v. Commissioner,"15 which the Tax Court relied
on in Horne, the court compared Dyer and Marston; the Schoenberg court concluded that the presence or absence of a prearranged
plan to reacquire the property sold to establish the loss determines
whether a sale followed by a repurchase is bona fide. Thus, the
Ruling's main thesis is a departure from precedent.
The Ruling also appears to rely in part on the taxpayer's ability to generate a short-term capital loss of $128x from a minimal
investment of $10x as margin. This, however, is irrelevant. Investors in some areas, most notably real estate, can obtain tax
benefits substantially in excess of funds invested or committed unless the Tax Reform Act of 1976 specifically provides otherwise.l 6
Furthermore, the Ruling's statement that a taxpayer's change
of position from a March/July straddle to a May/July straddle resulted in no change in economic position" i 7 is demonstrably incorrect. Analysis of price differentials in March 1974, May 1974, and
July 1974 silver on Commodity Exchange, Inc., for the period from
March 1, 1973 to February 18, 1974,118 discloses that a person who
111. 49 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1931).
112. Id. at 260.
113. 74 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1935).
114. 75 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1935).
115. 77 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1935).

116. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 280, 465. See generally Posin, Tax Shelters: How They
Work and the Changes Wrought by the 1976 Act, 1 REV. TAx. INDIVIDUALS 195

(1977).
117. Rev. RuL 77-185, 1977-21 I.R.B. 7, at 8.
118. The transactions which 'were the subject of the Ruling actually involved
straddles entered into in 1973 and liquidated in February 1974. Id. at 7.
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effected a March/July straddle on March 1, 1973, and carried that
position until February 26, 1974, would have sustained a far more
substantial loss than a person who switched into a May/July straddle at different points during the year. 119 Indeed, a person who
effected such a switch on October 10, 1973, would have realized a
profit (before commissions) of $100 per straddle as compared to a
loss (before commissions) of $310 by not switching at all.120
If the facts as stated in the Ruling are accurate, the entire
Ruling could have been based more convincingly on the transactions' lack of economic substance. The difficulty with this ground is
that it would have required the IRS to assume that the facts stated
in the Request for Technical Advice showing "substantial profit and
loss potential"'12 1 were false.
119. The differentials between March 1974 silver and July 1974 silver, and between May 1974 silver and July 1974 silver on Commodity Exchange, Inc., on the
dates listed below, as reported by The Wall Street Journal,were:
Differential
Straddle
Date
in Points*
Long
Short
March 1974/July 1974
5/1/73
500
9/4/73
670
10/12/73
260
12/3/73
470
2/26/74
810
May 1974/July 1974
9/4/73
330
10/12173
130
12/3/73
210
2/26/74
270
*100 points equals $.01. In 1973, a silver futures contract on Commodity
Exchange, Inc., was for 10,000 troy ounces of silver. Accordingly, a change
in the differential of 100 points equals a profit or loss of $100.
Thus, an investor who effected a March/July straddle on March 1, 1973, and
(i) did not liquidate that position until February 26, 1974, would have sustained a loss of $310 before commissions (500 minus 810 equals -310);
(ii) switched to a May/July straddle on September 4, 1973, and liquidated
that position on February 26, 1974, would have sustained a loss of $110
before commissions (500 minus 670 equals -170; 330 minus 270 equals
60; 60 plus -170 equals -110);
(iii) switched to a May/July straddle on December 3, 1973, and liquidated
that position on February 26, 1974, would have sustained a loss of $30
before commissions (500 minus 470 equals 30; 210 minus 270 equals
-60; 30 plus -60 equals -30).
120. An investor who entered into a March/July straddle on March 1, 1973, and
switched to a May/July straddle on October 12, 1973, would have realized a profit of
$240 (500 minus 260). However, on liquidating the May/July straddle on February
26, 1974, the investor would have lost $140 (130 minus 270), resulting in a net profit
of $100 before commissions. See note 119 supra.
121. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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This economic reality test often is applied in cases involving
transactions having virtually no purpose other than a reduction in
taxes. It is derived from Knetsch v. United States. 122 In Knetsch a
taxpayer purchased long-term deferred annuity savings bonds from
an insurance company. The principal was paid by nonrecourse
notes secured by the bonds, while a portion of the interest was
prepaid. 123 In addition, the taxpayer borrowed against nearly the
entire excess of the bond value over his indebtedness, once again
prepaying the interest. The taxpayer then deducted the prepaid
interest on his income tax return. 124 The Supreme Court concluded that the transactions were nondeductible shams, because
"there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from
this transaction beyond a tax deduction.' ' 1 25 Knetsch stands, then,
for the proposition that losses from transactions which have no
economic substance are not deductible.
A different principle, but one frequently applied in cases factually similar to Knetsch, was developed in Goldstein v. Commissioner.12 6 Taxpayer in Goldstein won the Irish sweepstakes and
thereafter purchased United States Treasury notes by obtaining
loans secured by these notes. 1 27 Although the comparative interest
rates of the loan and the notes made the transactions inherently
unsound from an economic viewpoint, the taxpayer's ability to take
a large deduction for prepaid interest during the year in which she
won the Irish sweepstakes, yielded her a substantial tax saving
which would have more than compensated her for out-of-pocket
losses.' 2 8 In disallowing the interest deductions, the Second Circuit specifically rejected the sham rationale of Knetsch in favor of a
more flexible formulation that has since become well-known:
[A] deduction for interest paid . . .in loan arrangements . ..
that can not with reason be said to have purpose, substance, or
utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences [is not
permitted].
[T]he deductibility of interest [should be permitted
only] when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred an obligation to pay interest in order to engage in what with reason
122. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
123. Id. at 362.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 366.
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Id. at 736.
Id. at 738-39.
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can be termed purposive activity, even though he decided to
borrow in order to gain an interest deduction rather than to finance the activity in some other way. 129
Comparing Knetsch with Goldstein clarifies that Goldstein was
only intended to apply where tax benefits are the sole reason for
the questioned transaction. In a case of mixed motives, interest
deductions should not be disallowed under Goldstein;'30 apparently
13 1
any nontax goal shoul suffice.
Numerous cases have followed Knetsch and Goldstein in disallowing deductions for losses incurred through sham transactions
32
and transactions having tax avoidance as their sole purpose;
nonetheless, no case has gone so far as to deny a tax deduction for
a transaction in which at least some profit motive, however subordinate to a tax avoidance purpose, is present. In some cases,
though, the taxpayer's contention that profit motive existed for a
particular transaction has been rejected as spurious; 133 in others,
the burden of proving profit motive has been placed upon the
4
taxpayer. 13
None of the above cases or principles support the Ruling. At
worst, from a taxpayer's viewpoint, the cases hold that to deduct a
loss from a commodity straddle transaction, taxpayer must establish
that the transaction gave rise to a reasonable potential for profit,
and thus had economic substance. Apart from the Ruling, there is
no support for the proposition that a taxpayer's dominant purpose
for engaging in a transaction should determine the tax treatment of
such a transaction. Probably the most serious criticism of a test
based on weighing relative motives and purposes is that uncertain35
ty will result from the difficulty in applying such a test uniformly.'
129. Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted).
130. "[T~he interest deduction should be permitted whenever it can be said
that the taxpayer's desire to secure an interest deduction is only one of mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer to borrow funds ....
."Id. at 741.
131. See Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in FederalIncome Taxation, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 485, 519 (1967).
132. E.g., Campbell v. Cen-tex, Inc., 377 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1967). See cases
cited notes 133 & 134 infra.
133. See, e.g., Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1968).
134. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 459 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
135. See Blum, supra note 131, at 515. Professor Blum argued that the IRS
should use an objective test, such as one focusing on the economic reality of a transaction. Tests which are vague and difficult to apply, involving motive, intent, and
purpose, should be discarded. See id. Professor Blum further indicates that courts
consistently have recognized this danger and have attempted to avoid making subjective judgments. See id. at 532.
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Based on Knetsch and Goldstein, it can be argued that the
individual straddle transactions which lack a profit-and-loss potential can be struck down as shams. 136 However, this would require a
factual determination on a case-by-case basis, rather than an IRS
ruling based on the factually erroneous conclusion that no such po137
tential exists.
CONCLUSION

The Ruling appears to have little basis under the Code, the
regulations adopted thereunder, or judicial precedent. It conflicts
with earlier IRS rulings which ostensibly had settled the only areas
of uncertainty with respect to tax treatment of commodity straddles, and which had, therefore, given assurance to the tax bar that
the IRS would continue to recognize commodity straddles as
legitimate transactions. If the IRS can demonstrate, however, that
a tax straddle offered a taxpayer no expectation of profit-a factual
issue not easily determined-then the disallowance of a loss resulting from such straddle is likely to be sustained based on Knetsch
and its progeny.
136. See generally Selig, supra note 26, at 66.
137.

See text accompanying notes 63, 131-135 supra.
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